Age-biased technological and organizational change: firm-level evidence and management implications by Beckmann, Michael & Schauenberg, Bernd
W I R T S C H A F T S W I S S E N S C H A F T L I C H E S  Z E N T R U M  ( W W Z )  D E R  U N I V E R S I T Ä T  B A S E L  
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
April 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Age-Biased Technological and Organizational Change: 
Firm-Level Evidence and Management Implications 
 
 
 
 
 
WWZ Discussion Paper 05/07 Michael Beckmann, Bernd Schauenberg 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
W W Z  |  P E T E R S G R A B E N  5 1  |  C H  –  4 0 0 3  B A S E L  |  W W W . W W Z . U N I B A S . C H  
 
The Author(s): 
 
Prof. Dr. Michael Beckmann 
Center of Business and Economics (WWZ) 
Department for Human Resources and Organization 
Rosshofgasse 2 
CH-4051 Basel, Switzerland 
michael.beckmann@unibas.ch 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A publication oft the Center of Business and Economics (WWZ), University of Basel.  
 
© WWZ Forum 2007 and the author(s). Reproduction for other purposes than the personal use needs 
the permission of the author(s). 
 
Contact: 
WWZ Forum | Petersgraben 51 | CH-4003 Basel | forum-wwz@unibas.ch | www.wwz.unibas.ch 
Age-Biased Technological and Organizational Change: 
Firm-Level Evidence and Management Implications 
 
 
Michael Beckmann∗
 
April 2007 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper examines the question, whether the growing use of new technologies and 
decentralized forms of work organization affects the age structure of workforces within 
firms. The initial idea behind this relationship is that technological and organizational 
change may not only be skill-biased, but also age-biased. Based on human capital theo-
retical explanations that mainly focus on skill obsolescence in association with the need 
to acquire new skills, the hypothesis of an age-biased technological and organizational 
change (ABTOC) is derived and tested econometrically using German firm-level data. 
The empirical results show that the adoption of technological and organizational inno-
vations decreases the firms’ demand for older workers and increases the demand for 
younger workers. Hence, ABTOC is found to be at the expense of older workers. Since 
ABTOC does not fit to the current development in terms of age-specific labor supply, 
this paper also suggests human resource management practices that encourage firms to 
combine the use of new technologies and organizational forms with an ageing work-
force.  
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I.  Introduction 
 
Since a couple of years many firms in industrialized countries have been restructuring 
their production processes adopting technological and organizational innovations. 
Nowadays, it is well known that the use of new production and information technolo-
gies and decentralized (holistic) forms of work organization including, for example, 
self-managed teams, just-in-time production, multi-tasking, and the delegation of deci-
sion rights, largely contributes to changing the employment patterns of heterogeneous 
workers. Particularly, the consequences on the firms’ demand for workers with different 
skill levels have widely been examined and many empirical studies provided evidence 
consistent to what is known today as skill-biased technological change (SBTC) and 
skill-biased organizational change (SBOC), respectively. Moreover, some studies exam-
ined if technological (and organizational) change is also gender-biased and found evi-
dence consistent with the hypothesis of a gender-biased technological change (GBTC) 
favoring female workers relative to male workers (e.g. Weinberg 2000, Beckmann, 
Schauenberg and Timmermann 2006).  
 
Similarly, the idea of this paper is that technological and organizational changes may 
also shift the age-specific labor demand of firms. Thereby, it is a prior unclear, whether 
technological and organizational change is biased against younger or older workers. If 
these innovations increased the demand for experience knowledge, older workers would 
benefit from their adoption relative to younger workers. Intuitively, however, it appears 
to be more likely that technological and organizational change shifts the age-structure of 
the workforces at the expense of older workers. First, according to the well-known re-
sults of SBTC and SBOC, both types of restructuring firms require workers adapting to 
new and multiple skills, for example, flexibility, responsibility, and cooperativeness to 
perform a variety of tasks. Second, according to human capital considerations, techno-
logical and organizational change is also supposed to involve and even accelerate skill 
obsolescence. Typically, the need of skill adaptation and skill obsolescence emerge con-
temporaneously in innovative corporate restructuring processes. As older workers are 
usually unprivileged relative to younger workers regarding the acquisition of necessary 
skills by formal training programs, their relative employment prospects may degrade 
with the intra-firm diffusion of technological and organizational innovations. If this 
were the case, technological and organizational change could be regarded as age-biased 
against older workers. New technologies and work practices would then be associated 
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with a relative decline in the demand for older workers. During the course of the paper, 
this viewpoint is called the hypothesis of an age-biased technological and organizational 
change (ABTOC).  
 
It is important to note, however, that an empirical confirmation of the ABTOC hypothe-
sis would call for a fundamental different firm behavior in terms of suitable adjustment 
strategies compared to SBTC or GBTC, respectively. This conclusion directly follows 
from the current labor supply developments. While the demand effects of SBTC and 
GBTC and the developments on the labor supply side look the same way, this would not 
be true in the ABTOC case. Firms can cope with SBTC quite easily because both the 
relative demand and supply of skilled workers increase simultaneously. Analogously, 
firms can benefit from an increasing relative supply of female workers, when techno-
logical change favors the employment patterns of female workers. However, if the AB-
TOC hypothesis was true, relative labor demand would clearly not correspond to the 
relative labor supply trend. While ABTOC is associated with an increase in the relative 
demand of younger workers, due to demographic reasons the long-term relative labor 
supply of younger workers is, in fact, declining. In Germany, for example, labor supply 
projections demonstrate that between 2005 and 2020 the labor supply rate of individuals 
aged 50 years and above will increase from 23 percent to 35 percent, while the corre-
sponding rate for individuals not exceeding the age of 30 years will decline from 22 
percent to 19 percent (Köchling 2000).1 Therefore, firms would be forced to reconcile 
their age-specific labor demand with a diametrically different labor supply. If the adop-
tion of technological and organizational innovations hampered the employment of older 
workers, this information would be bad news for the firms, because firms will increas-
ingly depend on ageing workforces in the future. As a result, firms would be desperate 
to develop human resource management practices that allow both the implementation of 
innovations and profitable employment of older workers.  
 
These considerations demonstrate that the objective of the present paper is twofold. 
First, the ABTOC hypothesis is tested econometrically analyzing the impact of techno-
logical and organizational innovations on the age structure of workforces with the aid of 
establishment data from West German firms. Second, the paper suggests human re-
source management strategies that encourage firms to combine new technologies and 
                                                          
1 Since 2000 the rate of labor suppliers aged 50 years and above has been exceeding the corresponding 
rate of the labor suppliers below 30 years. 
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organizational forms with an ageing workforce. In this context, an age-specific job de-
sign, continuous training for older workers, team work in mixed age-groups, and the 
dropping of seniority wages will exemplarily be discussed.  
 
A number of labor market statistics indicate a general and ongoing long-term trend to-
wards a decline in the employment patterns of older workers in a wide majority of in-
dustrialized countries. For example, statistics on the labor force participation and early 
retirement decisions of senior workers show that between 1960 and 1995 the average 
retirement age decreased in all OECD countries substantially. The declining employ-
ment rates for older workers, which are typical for most OECD countries, are in accor-
dance with this trend. Notably, the correspondent rates for Germany are far below 
OECD average. More precisely, in 1998 the employment rate of the 55 to 64 years old 
workers in Germany was 38.8 percent, while OECD average was 47.9 percent (Klös 
2000).2
 
Consistent with the relatively low employment rate of older workers in Germany is a 
relatively high and increasing unemployment rate. Since 1975 the share of the 55 to 64 
years old unemployed relative to all unemployed individuals registered in West Ger-
many has been increasing from 10.2 percent to 23.1 percent in 2000.3 At the same time, 
a directly opposed development regarding the unemployment of younger workers could 
be observed. While in 1975 28.6 percent of all unemployed in West Germany were 
younger than 25 years, this percentage decreased steadily to a level of 10.8 percent until 
the year 2000 (Institute for Employment Research 2002; 2003).4 Wage differentials 
represent another indicator of labor demand. Card and Lemieux (2001) report that in the 
United States, the United Kingdom and Canada the college-high school wage gap for 
younger men has ascended in the past 30 years, while the gap for older men has been 
                                                          
2 The difference is at least partially caused by the very common use of early retirement programs in Ger-
many. These programs enable firms to lay off older workers ahead of time, while a considerable part of 
their dismissal costs is borne by the German social security system (unemployment and pension insur-
ance). Since the mid 1980s German employers and employees have frequently been agreeing upon such 
early retirement rules.  
3 Nowadays, approximately 40 percent of all establishments in Germany do not employ workers aged 50 
years and above anymore (Strotmann and Hess 2003). This percentage refers to a survey among firms 
located in the German federal state Baden-Wuerttemberg. However, according to information of the 
Institute for Employment Research the reported share of about 40 percent is representative for the entire 
Germany.  
4 The directions of these patterns do not change substantially, when the age-specific population shares are 
applied as the determination base instead of total unemployment.  
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stable or declining. As a consequence, the wage differential between older and younger 
workers has also been declining. 
 
All these labor market outcomes reflect a declining relative demand for older workers.5 
Hence, it seems quite natural to test whether technological and organizational change 
contributes to shifting the age structure within firms at the expense of older workers. 
The very fact, namely, that dismissing older workers has legally been facilitated by 
early retirement rules cannot be reason enough to explain the decline in the demand for 
older workers. Rather, this development must mainly be driven by economic reasons. 
The sole existence of a non-binding law is unlikely to explain the impairing employ-
ment patterns of older workers sufficiently. Due to data availability the study focuses on 
firms located in the former West Germany.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II derives the ABTOC hy-
pothesis using standard human capital theory and delayed payments contract theory. 
Section III summarizes the results of prior empirical studies that aimed at explaining the 
observed labor market trends for older workers. The ABTOC hypothesis is econometri-
cally examined and confirmed in section IV using establishment data for the former 
West Germany. Section V therefore discusses human resource management practices 
that encourage firms to cope with an ageing workforce in a work environment influ-
enced by technological and organizational innovations. Finally, section VI concludes.  
 
II. The Hypothesis of an Age-Biased Technological and Organizational Change 
 
The labor market statistics mentioned in the introduction indicate a clear trend towards 
a declining relative demand for older workers. Rationally, a firm will only loose its in-
terest to employ an older worker, if his marginal productivity fall below his wage pay-
ments. Therefore, from the viewpoint of human capital theory a decline in the demand 
for older workers is far away from being self-explanatory. According to Becker (1962) 
standard human capital theory never postulates wage profiles that exceed the productiv-
ity of trained workers. In the case of general human capital formation a worker’s post-
training wage raises lock-step with his marginal productivity, while specifically trained 
                                                          
5 This observation is quite bizarre as due to the demographic trends to become apparent there is a lively 
political debate in Germany to rise the legal retirement age from 65 to 67 years. Obviously, the interests 
of German firms and social politicians in times of an ageing population are directly opposed. 
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workers earn wages below their marginal productivity. Why should a rational employer 
thus have an incentive to reduce his relative demand for older employees? Moreover, as 
older workers usually have accumulated more specific human capital than younger 
workers, employers should be less likely to lay off older workers. 
 
Even if the assumption of a competitive labor market, which is crucial for Becker’s 
model, is relaxed and labor market imperfections are explicitly taken into account, the 
question mentioned above must at first remain unanswered. Acemoglu and Pischke 
(1999a; 1999b) show that with labor market frictions firms will only have an incentive 
to invest in general skills, when post-training productivity exceeds post-training wages 
and wages rise less steeply than productivity. In other words, firms will only invest in 
general training, if they are able to earn rents, which increase with the skill level of their 
educated workers. Hence, even under the conditions of imperfect labor markets workers 
will not be paid above their marginal productivity. So far, therefore, the empirical ob-
servation of a declining relative demand for older workers remains a puzzle.  
 
A declining relative demand for older workers can only be explained rationally, when 
the employment of older workers is too expensive for a firm relative to the employment 
of younger workers. This condition holds, if the productivity-wage differential for older 
workers is smaller than for younger workers. Especially, if the wages of older workers 
exceed their marginal productivity, the firm has a strong incentive to lay these workers 
off and replace them by younger workers, who are expected to provide a more profit-
able productivity-wage relation. The fact that wages for skilled workers exceed their 
marginal productivity is a realistic scenario in at least two cases.  
 
In the first case, a firm pays seniority wages to prevent workers from shirking and en-
sure permanent working effort. This idea has been introduced by Lazear (1979; 1981). 
Central to this approach is that wage profiles are steeper than productivity profiles. As a 
result, young workers receive at first wage payments below their marginal productivity. 
This approach is equivalent to paying a bond to the employer, when tenure is low. The 
employer will return the bond to the older or more experienced worker by paying wages 
above marginal productivity. However, delayed payment contracts are typically suscep-
tible to double moral hazard, which means that the employer himself has a strong incen-
tive to behave opportunistically and lay older workers with high tenure off in order to 
retain the bond.  
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 The second case is more crucial to the analysis of this paper. Here, productivity falls 
below wage payments, when human capital depreciations play an important role in oc-
cupations and firms are reluctant to put new human capital investments into practice. 
When a worker’s tenure increases, the expected period of amortization declines, be-
cause the remaining duration of employment declines on average. Therefore, firms are 
likely to refrain from investing in the skills of older workers.6 When the depreciations 
of human capital exceed the current human capital investments, productivity declines 
(Mincer 1974). Provided that productivity declines more sharply than wages, at a par-
ticular time the productivity profile falls below the wage profile. From that time a firm 
would suffer net-costs, if it continued to employ older workers.  
 
It is well-known that technological and organizational changes require skilled work-
forces and employees, who are disposed to acquire new skills and adapt to new working 
environments permanently. Meanwhile, there is a large body of literature that docu-
ments a SBTC or a SBOC, respectively.7 New technologies and working practices in-
creasingly require employees with multiple skills who are able to deal with multiple 
tasks. The use of production and information technologies is more and more associated 
with intellectually demanding tasks, while pure operating tasks take a back seat. Simi-
larly, organizational innovations like self-managed team work, job rotation, and just-in-
time production call for the execution of coordination, cooperation, and delegation 
tasks. Hence, computerization and workplace decentralization tend to alter jobs and the 
necessary job skills, substituting for automated routine tasks and complementing non-
routine tasks (Friedberg 2003). Usually, educated workers are more productive on non-
routine tasks than unskilled workers. Thus, technological and organizational innova-
tions favor the employment of educated workers relative to unskilled workers. 
 
Moreover, it is also well-known that new technologies affect the obsolescence of skills, 
and thus, the rate at which human capital depreciates (Bartel and Sicherman 1993, 
Blechinger and Pfeiffer 1996, Ahituv and Zeira 2001, Rodriguez and Zavodny 2003). 
                                                          
6 Descriptive evidence supporting this argument can be found in Klös (2000). The author shows that only 
5 percent of the individuals aged 50 to 55 years and only 1 percent of those who are older than 55 years 
participate in occupational continuous training programs.  
7 See, for example, the seminal papers of Lindbeck and Snower (1996; 2000), Caroli and Van Reenen 
(2001), Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2002), and the surveys of Aghion, Caroli and Garcia-Penalosa 
(1999), Chennels and Van Reenen (1999), Snower (1999), Acemoglu (2002), Card and DiNardo (2002), 
or Beckmann (2004).  
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Intuitively, high rates of technological change will cause human capital to depreciate at 
a faster pace. The same can reasonably be assumed for innovative organizational work-
ing practices. As a consequence, in addition to the skill dimension, workers’ ages be-
come increasingly important in the discussion of the employment effects of technologi-
cal and organizational change. Specifically, the use of technological and organizational 
innovations within firms can be expected to accelerate the process of skill obsolescence 
and human capital depreciation. Therefore, even specific human capital that has tradi-
tionally protected older, more experienced workers from being dismissed may have 
become less valuable for employers (Rodriguez and Zavodny 2003). As a result, unless 
older workers are not retrained to acquire the necessary skills technological and organ-
izational change is likely to encourage firms to reduce their relative demand for older 
workers.  
 
Since technological and organizational innovations make some existing human capital 
obsolete, while contemporaneously creating demand for new types of skills, the em-
ployment of younger workers appears to be more attractive for innovative firms for at 
least two reasons. First, due to their recent education younger workers are more likely to 
provide the necessary state-of-the-art skills in the first place than older workers. Sec-
ond, even if retraining workers can outweigh the skill shortcomings driven by technical 
and organizational change, firms will be more likely to offer continuous training to 
younger than older workers. The reason for this expected firm behavior is that retraining 
younger workers is supposed to be more profitable than investing in the skills of older 
workers, because, on average, firms have more time to recoup the training costs and are 
thus more likely to earn rents. Analogously, older workers themselves are often reluc-
tant to invest in skill adaptation, because the remaining time horizon is supposed to be 
too short to capture the returns to their investment. Hence, the theoretical analysis sug-
gests the hypothesis that technological and organizational change is not only skill-
biased, but also age-biased at the expense of older workers.  
 
III. Related Empirical Work 
 
While examining the determination of age-specific employment patterns, the majority 
of recent work has focused on the supply side of the labor market. As a result, many 
studies analyze the retirement decisions of older workers using individual-level data. 
However, as technological and organizational innovations definitely affect business 
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strategies and production processes, they should also have an impact on the age-specific 
labor demand of firms, which therefore deserves some more research attention than be-
fore.  
 
The first stream of empirical literature investigates, whether older workers can be sup-
posed to be more protected than younger workers, when firms cut existing jobs. For 
example, the empirical results of Boisjoly, Duncan and Smeeding (1998) indicate that 
older workers are generally less likely to be displaced than younger workers. The prob-
ability of involuntary job loss is significantly lower among male workers aged 35 and 
older than among men aged 25-34 with the same education attainment. Similarly, using 
German firm-level data Beckmann (2001; 2004) also found that downsizing decisions 
of the firms primarily go at the expense of younger workers. In contrast to a net-
reduction in staff, however, churning is associated with a declining share of older work-
ers and an increasing share of younger workers. The conclusion is therefore twofold. 
First, when firms aim at initiating net-reductions in jobs older workers are protected by 
seniority rules or specific human capital. Second, the result for staff replacements is in 
line with human capital depreciations or the delayed payments contract model of Lazear 
(1979; 1981).  
 
A second research stream on the careers of senior workers argues on the basis of indi-
vidual-level data but does not explicitly emphasize technological or organizational ef-
fects. For example, Chan and Stevens (2001) used individual-level data from the Health 
and Retirement Study and examined the senior workers’ reemployment opportunities 
following an involuntary job loss. Their main result is that the future reemployment 
options of displaced workers significantly decline with the workers’ age. Older workers 
are much less likely to be reemployed quickly than younger workers. Analyzing data 
from the Displaced Workers Surveys, Rodriguez and Zavodny (2003) found an increas-
ing risk of involuntarily jobs losses for middle-aged and older workers relative to 
younger workers. Antolin and Scarpetta (1998) investigated the determinants of retire-
ment decisions in Germany using micro data from the German Socio-Economic Panel. 
They found evidence consistent with the usually claimed explanations for early retire-
ment. First of all, socio-demographic factors have a strong impact on the retirement 
decisions of older workers. Another result is that a worker’s bad health increases the 
probability of an early drop out of the labor force. Finally, financial incentives provided 
by the pension system, for example by generous early retirement plans, also turned out 
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to be powerful in shaping the age profile of retirement. Using data from the Health and 
Retirement Study, Adams (2002) examined, whether older workers who report that their 
employers generally favor younger workers in promotion decisions are objectively be 
harmed. The author found a lower wage growth and a greater propensity of early re-
tirement for older workers who subjectively felt to be discriminated due to their age. 
Hence, firms were indeed identified to panelize older workers by denying them promo-
tion opportunities.  
 
A third research stream examines the employment patterns of differently aged and ten-
ured workers analyzing the courses of productivity and wage profiles (e.g. Mendes de 
Oliviera, Cohn and Kiker 1989, Kotlikoff and Gokhale 1992, Haltiwanger, Lane and 
Spletzer 1999, Andersson, Holmlund and Lindh 2002, Crepon, Deniau and Perez-
Duarte 2002). All these studies found evidence for inverted U-shaped wage and produc-
tivity profiles, where productivity rises and declines much steeper than wages. More-
over, individuals aged between 30 and 40 years realize the highest level of productivity. 
Employees above the age of 50 are found to have lower productivity and higher wage 
levels than prime-age workers. Hence, wages of older workers continue to rise in spite 
of a declining productivity. Typical for both profiles is a coinciding discrepancy be-
tween productivity and wages, where prime-age workers are underpaid and older work-
ers are overpaid relative to their productivity.8 In this situation firms will lose from em-
ploying older workers and profit from replacing them by younger workers. Therefore, 
the results suggest that the unfavorable productivity-wage differentials for older work-
ers encourage firms to exclude them from the workforce, since they cost more than they 
produce.  
 
A fourth stream of literature closely relates the declining employment patterns for older 
workers resulting from unfavorable productivity-wage differentials to the rapid growth 
of technological (and organizational) innovations. One study which is based on individ-
ual-level data comes from Bartel and Sicherman (1993). The authors used data from the 
National Longitudinal Surveys of older men and found that the retirement decisions of 
older workers are affected by technological change in two ways. First, given a net posi-
tive correlation between technical change and on-the-job training, workers in technol-
ogy-intense industries retire later than workers occupied in less technology-intense sec-
                                                          
8 This result is consistent with the existence of delayed payment contracts and skill obsolescence.  
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tors. Second, an unexpected technology shock causes older workers to retire sooner, 
because the necessary retraining is considered to be an unattractive investment. On the 
basis of repeated cross sections from the Current Population Survey and longitudinal 
data from the Health and Retirement Study, Friedberg (2003) found that impending re-
tirement rather than age alone explains why older workers use computers less than 
prime-age workers. In turn, however, changes in skill requirements also affect retire-
ment plans as computer users retire later than non-users. The explanation for this result 
is that computer users either have the required skills or find it worthwhile to adopt them. 
Ahituv and Zeira (2001) merged data from the Health and Retirement Study with data 
on sector-specific productivity growth to test their claim that technological innovations 
induce early retirement of older workers. Their empirical results can indeed confirm 
their theoretical model, where human capital is technology-specific, so that technical 
change erodes some existing human capital. More precisely, the authors found that 
technical change contributes to reducing the aggregate labor force participation of older 
workers. Similarly, the results of Peracchi and Welch (1994) suggest that technological 
advances primarily pressurize older unskilled workers pushing them out of the labor 
force.  
 
Boockmann and Zwick (2004) base their study on a sub-sample of the 2002-wave of the 
German IAB Establishment Panel to examine the employment determinants of older 
workers in general. One of their results is that firms using state-of-the-art technology 
employ fewer older workers than less technology-intense firms. Similar to the present 
study, Aubert, Caroli and Roger (2006) also investigated the relationship between new 
technologies, workplace organization and the age structure of the workers using a sam-
ple of French manufacturing firms. The authors provided evidence that innovative firms 
are characterized by relatively low wage bill shares of older workers, while the opposite 
holds for younger workers. Furthermore, the age-bias is found to be prevalent within 
occupational groups suggesting that even skilled workers are not completely protected 
against the labor market consequences of ageing. A final result comes from an analysis 
of employment inflows and outflows, where the authors showed that technological in-
novations enhance hiring opportunities for younger workers, while decreasing them for 
older workers. In contrast, organizational adjustments increase the exit probability for 
older workers, while younger workers are less likely to quit or being laid off in firms 
with an innovative work organization. All these results are consistent with the skill ob-
solescence interpretation mentioned above.  
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 IV. Econometric Analysis 
 
IV.1 Data, Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
 
The data set used in this study is the Establishment Panel of the German Institute for 
Employment Research (IAB). This data set constitutes a firm-level survey, which is 
conducted every year since 1993. At first, the survey was restricted to West German 
firms. Since 1996 also East German firms have been taking part in the survey. The IAB 
Establishment Panel contains information about the firms’ business policies and devel-
opments, innovations, workforce structures, recruitment and separation decisions, 
wages, working times, apprenticeship and further training programs, industrial relations, 
etc. Starting with a sample size of about 4,000 establishments, the IAB Establishment 
Panel currently provides information of more than 15,000 firms of all firm sizes and 
industries, which makes it being the most extensive firm-level data set in Germany. 
 
The investigation in this paper uses data of the panel waves 1993 and 1995 and is there-
fore restricted to West German firms. So far, the panel wave of 1995 is the only wave 
containing detailed information about age-specific employment shares. Furthermore, in 
1995 employers have for the first time been asked, whether or not they make use of cer-
tain work organization practices. Finally, the panel wave of 1993 is additionally used to 
address the problem of endogenous explanatory variables. The 1993 wave provides the 
lagged variables, which are incorporated into the econometric model in order to avoid a 
possible simultaneity bias.  
 
The data set contains information about the age structure of the employees within firms. 
Specifically, firms have been asked for their number of workers not exceeding an age of 
30 years and their number of workers, who are at least 50 years old. This information 
can be used to generate the dependent variables for the econometric analysis. The vari-
able YOUNG  represents the share of workers not exceeding the age of 30 years, while 
 measures the share of workers aged 50 years and above.OLD 9 Table 1 displays the 
average age-specific employment shares in relation to firm size classes.  
                                                          
9 A detailed description of all variables used in this study can be found in the appendix in Table A1 and 
Table A2.  
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 [Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
The results show that the employment shares range between about 23 and 32 percent for 
younger workers and between 17 and 25 percent for older workers. Apart from the firms 
which employ less than five employees, the share of younger workers tends to decline 
with firm size, while the opposite holds for the share of older workers. Finally, likewise 
excepting the smallest firms, the younger workers-older workers ratio within firms is 
always greater than unity.  
 
Technological change can be measured by two variables. The first variable is 
, which captures the current technological status of a firm’s production and 
information technologies. TSTATUS  is a variable measured at an ordinal scale ranging 
between 1 and 5. The value 1 means “the current technological equipment is obsoles-
cent”, while 5 is equivalent to “the technological equipment is state-of-the-art”. The 
declarations are thereby based on subjective evaluations of the employers. Similarly, 
 is also an ordinally scaled variable ranging between 0 and 2. Here, 0 repre-
sents firms, which have in the previous year neither invested in new production tech-
nologies, nor in information technologies. The value 1 captures firms, which have either 
invested in new production technologies, or in new information technologies, while 2 
finally means that firms have invested in both new production and information tech-
nologies. Table 2 lists the descriptive statistics of both variables indicating technologi-
cal progress.  
TSTATUS
TINVEST
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
The strategy of estimating the coefficients of both explanatory variables representing 
technological innovations separately would probably induce a collinearity problem, 
because the variables are highly correlated. Collinearity usually comes along with ex-
cessive standard errors for the estimated coefficients and may therefore lead to spurious 
insignificances or misleading interpretations, respectively. For this reason, both tech-
nology variables are combined to one single explanatory variable applying the method 
of Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2002). At first, the authors standardize each ex-
planatory variable separately, i.e., they calculate ( ) ( ) xxxxSTD σ−= , where x  is the 
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mean and xσ  is the standard deviation of a variable x . The combined variable can then 
be calculated by adding up the standardized single variables and standardizing the out-
come once again. The resulting variable has a zero mean and a unity variance regardless 
of the scale level of the original variables. In the present case, the technology variable 
 can be calculated as follows: TECH
( ( ) ( )) .TINVESTSTDTSTATUSSTDSTDTECH +=     (1) 
The construction of an explanatory variable measuring organizational innovation is 
analogous to the previous case. Organizational change is usually related to the decen-
tralization of hierarchical structures within firms, which directly involves a more decen-
tralized workplace organization. In the IAB Establishment Panel, these organizational 
innovations are captured by several dummy variables, which are summarized in Table 
3.  
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
For example, firms that have recently cut hierarchy levels are captured by the dummy 
variable . The variable  measures, whether or not firms have dele-
gated decision rights and responsibility to lower-ranked hierarchical levels. TEAM  in-
dicates firms, which have introduced team work concepts. The dummy variable 
 receives the value 1, if firms have rationalized in the past by combining the 
tasks of at least two departments or divisions, respectively. Firms, which have changed 
their organization of production by adopting just-in-time production, are covered by the 
explanatory variable . Finally,  measures firms, which have established 
profit or cost center divisions.  
HLEVEL DELEGA
DIVISION
JIT PCENTER
 
Milgrom and Roberts (1990; 1995) as well as Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994) have 
introduced the concept of the firm as a system of factor complementarities. This view 
suggests that organizational change should account for interdependencies between sin-
gle practices and avoid hasty isolated adjustments. For this reason and in order to pre-
vent the collinearity problems mentioned above, a standardized system variable is gen-
erated and added to the model instead of introducing all the single organizational vari-
ables separately. Thus, the process of variable generation is similar to the specification 
of the technology variable TECH . In the first step, therefore, the sum of the dummy 
variables is calculated. The result is a variable OC  valued in the interval between 0 and 
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6, where 0 (6) means that the firm has adopted none (all) of the organizational practices. 
Hence, larger values of  indicate a higher amount of organizational innovativeness 
within firms. In the second step, OC  is standardized to receive the variable ORGA , 
which will finally be used for model estimation: 
OC
( ) .OCSTDORGA =          (2) 
In addition to the variables TECH  and , which are supposed to provide informa-
tion about the ABTOC hypothesis, the regression model contains a number of other 
(control) variables. These additional explanatory variables will be introduced in the 
course of the following subsection, in which the econometric model and the estimation 
approach are illustrated.  
ORGA
 
IV.2 Econometric Strategy  
 
In microeconomic theory firm behavior can adequately be characterized by the use of 
production or cost functions. When econometric modeling is embedded in a classical 
labor demand framework, factor demand equations are usually derived from cost func-
tions. The estimated labor demand functions in this paper are derived from a transcen-
dental logarithmic cost function (translog), which has been introduced by Christensen, 
Jorgenson and Lau (1973). The major advantage of the translog function compared to 
the alternative Cobb-Douglas or CES function is that the elasticities of substitution be-
tween the input factors are not restricted to unity or a constant value, respectively. Fur-
thermore, the use of a translog cost function allows the derivation of factor demand 
equations, which are linear in the parameters. In the sequel, a short-term variable trans-
log cost function is assumed, where variable costs arise by the use of heterogeneous 
labor inputs, i.e. in the present case, workers belonging to different age-groups. The 
term  describes the variable wage costs for age-group i . The quasi-fixed input factor 
capital is expressed by two components – the usual capital stock 
iW
K  and organizational 
capital R .10 More precisely, in the present context R  represents both technological and 
organizational innovations. 
 
The specification of a variable translog cost function allows to derive the following 
variable wage cost shares for every age-group : i
                                                          
10 The separation in usual and organizational or technology intense capital is according to Chennels and 
Van Reenen (1999) and Bond and Van Reenen (2003).  
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Here,  is the firm’s output and the Y iβ  describe the coefficients to be estimated. The 
input factor labor of the age-group  and organizational capital are complementary 
(substitutive), if 
i
0>iRβ  ( 0<iRβ ). Organizational capital (technological and organiza-
tional innovations) is age-biased against older workers, if jRiR ββ > , where 
 and YOUNGi = OLDj = .  
 
Unfortunately, equation (3) cannot be estimated directly, because firm-level data sets do 
usually not contain detailed information about age-specific wages  but only aggre-
gate information about the firm’s total wage bill W . This instance also applies to the 
IAB Establishment Panel. In econometric applications the usual strategy to address the 
problem of unobservable wage terms is to proxy the  by variables representing the 
structure of the workforce, firm size, sector affiliation, and regional affiliation. These 
proxies are supposed to capture the unobservable wage effects. Furthermore, neither the 
age-specific wage cost shares  can directly be observed on the basis of firm-level 
data. The problem of unobserved wage cost shares is usually solved by replacing  
with the corresponding employment share .
iW
iW
iS
iS
iL
11 In the present case,  represents the 
employment share of the age-group i . In this manner, a wage cost share equation can be 
transformed to a labor demand equation.  
iL
 
Applied econometricians usually proxy the output variable Y  by total sales or value 
added, respectively. However, instead of solely using an output measure, it could also 
be helpful to calculate an output-input ratio WY  to examine the effect of the produc-
tivity-wage differential on the age structure of the firm. According to the theoretical 
results introduced in section 2 large productivity-wage differentials should be associ-
ated with low employment shares of older workers relative to other age-groups. Con-
trary, small or even negative productivity-wage differentials can be explained by skill 
obsolescence which is supposed to become a crucial factor, when the employment share 
of older workers is relatively high.  
 
                                                          
11 See, for example, Chennels and Van Reenen (1999), Falk and Seim (1999), or Hujer, Caliendo and Ra-
dic (2002). 
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Finally, another problem may occur, when the estimation approach fails to account for 
an endogenous technological and organizational change. In the first instance, equation 
(3) considers technological and organizational innovations expressed by Rln  to be ex-
ogenous. However, this view neglects that firms usually take up an active part in adopt-
ing technological and organizational innovations. The model specification and estima-
tion approach should explicitly account for this problem of endogeneity.  
 
Taking all these issues into account, the following system of augmented labor demand 
equations can be derived from the cost share equations (3):  
( )
.,,
,
lnln
1
1
11110
OLDAGEDMIDDLEYOUNGi
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  (4) 
The term for organizational capital in (3), Rln , is replaced in equation (4) by the tech-
nology and work organization variables TECH  and . The expression ORGA Y  in the 
explanatory output-input variable WY  refers to the firms’ total sales instead of value 
added.12 Since firm-level data sets usually lack for information about capital stocks, K  
measures the firms’ total investment in the considered period. Due to relative high capi-
tal depreciations per period the recent investments provide an adequate proxy variable 
for the unobservable capital stock. The expression  describes the error term of the 
regression equation  and has the usual characteristics, i.e., ∼
iu
i iu ( )2;0 uN σ .  
 
Finally, the unobservable age-specific wages  from equation (3) are proxied by vari-
ables for the structure of the workforce (share of skilled workers, share of part-time 
workers, share of apprentices, share of participants in further training programs), firm 
size, sector affiliation, and regional affiliation. All these control variables are summa-
iW
                                                          
12 Strictly speaking, value added (sales – intermediates) would be the theoretically correct measure for Y  
in equation (4), because intermediate products and services represent another input factor in the produc-
tion or cost function. Nevertheless, the model specification includes total sales instead of value added for 
two reasons. First, the use of value added would have been associated with a substantial reduction of the 
number of observations, because many employers reported their sales volume, but were not able to give 
details upon their intermediates. Second, the item non-responses are unlikely to be randomly distributed. 
As a result, the estimates of the coefficients would be biased, if value added was part of WY . In the 
present case, the results of a probit estimation show that the probability of item non-responses regarding 
the firms’ intermediates is highly correlated with firm size. Consequently, the explanatory variable WY  
is generated using the firms’ total sales to avoid a potential selection bias, which would be associated 
with a variable that includes intermediates.  
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rized in the vector . Additional control variables reflect staff reduction, the firms’ 
use of incentive contracts (delayed payment contracts, pension plans), the commitment 
to collective wage agreements, the existence of a works council, the firm’s proneness to 
seasonal fluctuations, the firm’s legal form, and its economic independence. Possible 
endogeneity problems should be prevented by instrumenting the original variables with 
lagged explanatory variables. All these variables have a time lag of one or more years 
indicated by the time index .
jX
1−t 13 This approach limits the problem of endogeneity, 
because the use of lagged variables resolves the simultaneity of the firm’s decision 
processes with respect to the adoption of innovations and the adjustment of the structure 
of the workforce. 
 
The present model specification in equation (4) considers three dependent variables, 
which are all regressed on the same set of explanatory variables. Since (4) has been de-
rived from a translog cost function, the homogeneity condition imposes two restrictions. 
First, the sum of the intercepts of all three system equations must equalize unity. Sec-
ond, the sum of the three coefficients of each explanatory variable must be equal to 
zero. Moreover, as the sum of the employment shares necessarily equalizes unity, one 
of the equations becomes redundant. Due to the parameter restrictions the coefficients 
for this equation directly follow from the estimates of the remaining equations. In the 
present case, the equations for the share of younger workers ( YOUNGi = ) and older 
workers ( ) as the dependent variables will be estimated, while the equation for 
middle-aged workers (
OLDi =
AGEDMIDDLEi −= ) will be omitted. 
 
Under these conditions, equation (4) reduces to a bivariate regression model. In princi-
ple, both equations can be estimated separately using OLS. However, the jointly estima-
tion of the equations has the advantage that it allows the calculation of the inter-
equation covariances for the residuals and the coefficients, while providing the same 
parameter estimates and standard errors like OLS. The inter-equation covariances can 
be used to calculate the correlation between the residuals 14iu  and perform significance 
tests for the coefficients in different equations. Especially the opportunity to perform 
                                                          
13 The strategy to account for endogeneity by using lagged explanatory variables can also be found in 
Caroli and Van Reenen (2001) and Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2002). 
14 Since the present model specification considers two dependent variables regarding the firms’ structure 
of the workforce, a substantial correlation between the residuals of both equations appears to be quite 
natural.  
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significance tests for the coefficients in both equations is very useful in the present con-
text. Hence, multivariate regression analysis is preferred to a simple multiple regression 
model. As a result, according to Wooldridge (2002) the adequate estimation approach is 
SOLS (system OLS) instead of the usual OLS equation by equation.  
 
IV.3 Empirical Results  
  
Table 4 summarizes the estimates for the equations of the employment share of younger 
workers (YOUNG ) and the employment share of older workers (OLD ) resulting from 
bivariate regression analysis.15 Panels A-D display the estimates for the technological 
and organizational variables resulting from several model specifications that differ in 
the set of other explanatory and control variables.16 Moreover, as an alternative to the 
SOLS estimation of the preferred Panel D, Panel E displays the results of an OLS re-
gression applying heteroskedasdicity-consistent standard errors according to White 
(1980) instead of conventional standard errors. The purpose of these different specifica-
tions and estimation strategies is to check the robustness of the estimated coefficients.  
 
 [Insert Table 4 about here]  
 
The estimation results strongly support the ABTOC hypothesis. Both technological and 
organizational innovations are associated with larger shares of younger workers and 
lower shares of older workers. Remarkably, in both equations the successive addition of 
further control variables involves declining coefficients for the technology variable 
 in absolute terms (excepting the transition from Panel C to Panel D in the  
equation). However, the coefficients stay significant at the 5 percent level. In contrast, 
controlling for more observable firm heterogeneity always increases the coefficients for 
the organizational variable  in absolute terms. In the end, in Panel D the coeffi-
cient in the YOUNG  equation is significant at the 10 percent level, while simultane-
TECH OLD
ORGA
                                                          
15 Firms from the agricultural sector and forestry are excluded from the analysis. The same holds for 
firms, which employ less than ten employees. The purpose of this restriction is to avoid a selection bias 
due to the fact that a significant number of firms do not employ any worker in one of the considered age-
groups.  
16 Except from the dummy variables representing firm size, sector affiliation, and regional affiliation, the 
coefficients for the remaining explanatory variables are listed in Table A3 in the appendix. An interpreta-
tion of each of the coefficients is beyond the scope of the paper. However, the coefficients for the vari-
able  deserve some attention as they confirm the importance of seniority rules within the 
German dismissal legislation. When firms downsize, the younger workers are primarily concerned (ce-
teris paribus), while older workers are legally protected by seniority rules imposing a number of lay-off 
barriers to the firms. 
DOWNSIZE
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ously the significance of the coefficient in the OLD  equation improves from the 5 per-
cent to the 1 percent level. Hence, explicitly accounting for firm characteristics by esti-
mating augmented system equations does not diminish the significant effect of techno-
logical and organizational innovations on the age structure of the firm but, on the con-
trary, rather contributes to stabilizing or reinforcing the effect.  
 
Moreover, the results of the inter-equation  test on equality of corresponding coeffi-
cients additionally confirm the age bias of new technologies and organizational prac-
tices against older workers. The test statistics are relatively unambiguous rejecting the 
null hypothesis of equal coefficients in almost all cases. Most importantly, the -
statistics for the complete model in Panel D are highly significant for both technological 
and organizational innovations.  
βF
βF
 
Additionally, the results of the alternative estimation strategy, i.e., the robust OLS pro-
cedure for each single equation displayed in Panel E, are very similar to the SOLS esti-
mates deviating by construction only in the standard errors of the coefficients. Apart 
from the robust coefficient estimate for the variable TECH  in the YOUNG  equation, 
where significance reduces from the 5 to the 10 percent level, the significance levels 
obtained by SOLS remain unaffected. Hence, the achieved results that strongly confirm 
the ABTOC hypothesis also stand up to alternative estimation strategies and can there-
fore be regarded as being robust.  
 
Finally, an interesting result comes from the explanatory variable ( WYln ), which 
measures the productivity-wage bill relation within firms. Specifically, the estimates in 
Table A3 in the appendix indicate a significant negative correlation between ( )WYln  
and the share of older workers. In addition, the corresponding  test yields a prob 
value which is significant at the 10 percent level (
βF
087.0=p ). These outcomes are con-
sistent with the skill obsolescence interpretation. Provided that there is no adequate re-
training for older workers, intra-firm productivity-wage differentials decline due to skill 
obsolescence and sometimes even turn negative. On the contrary, when firms are char-
acterized by relatively large productivity-wage differentials they are also less likely to 
employ a large share of older workers.  
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Since both the effect for ( WYln ) and the effects for TECH  and ORGA  are consistent 
with skill obsolescence, the depreciation effect can be disentangled to some extent. 
First, the coefficients for the innovation variables TECH  and ORGA  can be supposed 
to capture (at least a part of) that kind of skill obsolescence, which results from a de-
crease in the market value of skills. In this case, human capital depreciation is externally 
driven by competition, which encourages firms to keep innovative. Thus, as the adop-
tion of innovations contemporaneously involve both the obsolescence and the develop-
ment of skills to adapt to changing working environments, the market value perspective 
reflects the Schumpeterian view of creative destruction. Second, the coefficient for 
( WYln ) can be considered to measure the residual internal depreciation of skills. Here, 
skill obsolescence can be caused by declining physical capabilities, for example due to 
ageing, injuries, and illness, or by disregarding the use of skills.17
 
The empirical results as a whole lead to the conclusion that technological and organiza-
tional change is at least partially age-specific. More precisely, the adoption of techno-
logical and organizational innovations within firms is biased against older workers. 
Thereby, the age bias does not only exist in relative terms, i.e., jRiR ββ > , where 
 und YOUNGi = OLDj = , but also in absolute terms, because the coefficients in both 
equations have different signs. Both technological and organizational innovations have 
been found to be complementary to a younger workforce ( 0>iRβ ), while they substi-
tute for older workers ( 0<jRβ ). The results are therefore in line with the findings of 
Aubert, Caroli and Roger (2005), who proceed similarly using data for French manufac-
turing firms.  
 
It is important to recognize, that the confirmation of the ABTOC hypothesis directly 
calls for a fundamental change in the behavior of many firms. More specifically, in the 
context of recent and lasting demographic trends the empirical results of this paper 
strongly suggest firms to adjust several areas of human resource management substan-
tially, for example, staff recruitment and separation, training and wage policies, and 
work organization. In fact, the relative labor demand of innovative firms is diametri-
cally opposed to the long-term relative labor supply trend, which is becoming more and 
                                                          
17 See also Aubert, Caroli and Roger (2006). The distinction between internal and external depreciation 
of human capital can be attributed to Rosen (1975).  
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more apparent in most industrialized countries. Hence, as firms will increasingly have 
to cope with ageing workforces, they are forced to develop management practices that 
allow both the implementation of innovations and profitable employment of older 
workers. Some of these policies are discussed more detailed in the next section. 
 
V. Managing an Ageing Workforce in Innovative Working Environments 
 
So far, a wide majority of firms appear to ignore demographic change and the resulting 
consequences with respect to ageing workforces and an ageing labor supply. According 
to results of the IAB Establishment Panel only three to four percent of the German firms 
currently believe that superannuation is going to become a future problem of personnel 
management. However, these firms obviously disregard the fact that it is very short-
sighted to reflect upon human resource strategies that primarily focus on younger, re-
portedly more capable and innovative workers first at the time when these workers be-
come scarcer on the labor market. For example, demographic projections for Germany 
imply that in order to cope with ageing workforces firms are required to preventively 
adjust human resource management and adopt a long-term staff development in the first 
decade of the century. Therefore, firms are asked to realize these adjustments until 2010 
to keep innovative and competitive in the long run, while ignoring demographic labor 
supply trends and idling can be very expensive (Buck, Kistner and Mendius 2002). 
 
Management practices that appear suitable to make the employment of older workers 
more attractive when firms decide to adopt new technologies or decentralize their work 
organization must allow improving the relation of productivity and wages. Hence, ad-
justment strategies must either contribute to increasing the productivity of older workers 
handling technological and organizational innovations or cutting the wages of older 
workers. In this context, firms are asked to take the following adjustment policies into 
account: age-specific job design, continuous training for older workers, team work in 
mixed age-groups, and the dropping of seniority wages.  
 
V.1 Age-Specific Job Design 
 
A well-known result of the tayloristic vs. holistic work organization debate is that en-
during monotonous efforts are likely to lower workers’ productivity and should there-
fore be diminished, for example, by systematic job rotation. Especially, low skilled, 
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physically demanding tasks are associated with monotonous efforts. In addition, physi-
cal abilities of workers naturally decline with age, which also impairs productivity. 
Hence, in order to combine innovations and ageing workforces older workers should be 
relieved of physically demanding tasks. Instead, these tasks can preferably be under-
taken by younger workers. In return, older workers can increasingly engage in mentor-
ing and coaching tasks and train younger workers informally. Thereby, older workers 
transfer not only explicit knowledge and experiences to younger workers but even im-
plicit knowledge. In this way, younger workers benefit from the experiences and the 
specific knowledge of senior workers. Hence, such an age-adequate job design explic-
itly considers age-specific comparative advantages and thus contributes to realizing 
complementary effects.  
 
However, it is important to note that knowledge transfer from older to younger workers 
is not a matter of course. On the contrary, older workers are likely to refrain from shar-
ing their knowledge and experiences with younger workers voluntarily, because knowl-
edge transfer contributes to impairing their intra-firm competitiveness relative to 
younger workers. Therefore, the adoption of mentoring and coaching programs should 
be accompanied by other management practices that provide incentives for older work-
ers to reveal private information. For example, relative job security should be one fea-
ture of human resource management. If jobs were insecure, older workers would refuse 
to transfer their experience knowledge to younger workers voluntarily, because knowl-
edge sharing increases the risk for older workers to become redundant. In contrast, if 
human resource management is characterized by stable employment relationships, older 
workers are more likely to share their knowledge with younger workers. The adoption 
of group incentives represents a second example for a human resource management 
supporting knowledge transfer. If workers were compensated on the basis of a team 
output, older team members would extrinsically be encouraged to reveal their experi-
ences and knowledge to younger members of the team.18
 
V.2 Continuous Training for Older Workers 
 
                                                          
18 A more detailed discussion of suitable incentives to accompany mentoring programs is beyond the 
scope of the paper. Other suitable instruments are worker empowerment, performance evaluation includ-
ing knowledge sharing as a decision criterion, cooperative leadership, or a corporate culture signaling 
open book management and tolerating mistakes.  
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This adjustment strategy directly aims at enhancing the productivity and thus improving 
the productivity-wage-gap of older workers. It is well-known that firms are usually less 
likely to invest in the skills of senior workers. Moreover, even senior workers are often 
reluctant to learn new tasks in innovative working environments. As a consequence, the 
previously accumulated skills become obsolete and the productivity of senior workers 
declines. However, older workers are neither lacking the ability nor the motivation to 
learn necessarily. Very often a relative low learning motivation of older workers is the 
result of the simple fact that they are not used to learn anymore. Thus, older workers 
may simply be frightened to acquire new skills. For both employers and employees, 
therefore, the period of amortizing human capital investments is of crucial importance. 
In this context, firms and older workers may benefit from current political efforts to lift 
up mandatory retirement ages, and thus, extend lifetime working times. Investing in the 
skills of older workers would become more beneficial for both parties, if the amortiza-
tion period was extended. 
 
Although the calling to intensify continuous training for senior workers appears to be 
necessary, it is clearly not sufficient. Moreover, firms are asked to develop elaborate 
concepts of life-long learning for all age-groups. Nowadays, apprenticeship certificates 
and even university degrees are only the basis for additional investments in human capi-
tal throughout the whole occupation. Usually, the skills accumulated for the first job are 
not sufficient anymore to allow a worker practicing his job unmodified until retirement. 
In addition to formal continuous training programs the productivity of older workers 
may also be increased applying informal training. Such informal training may take 
place, for example, in a team work environment.  
 
V.3 Team Work in Mixed Age-Groups  
 
Team work is an essential feature of holistic work organizations, which combines coop-
erative working with informal training and learning. The adoption of team work in 
mixed age-groups would be productive, if the team output reached at least the same 
level of a homogenous team consisting of younger workers. The rationale for team work 
in mixed age-groups is that these teams combine the comparative advantages of older 
and younger workers. Meanwhile, it is commonly accepted and confirmed by empirical 
studies that older workers have comparative advantages in areas as experience knowl-
edge and established consumer relationships, firm-specific human capital, working mo-
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tivation, perception of quality, leadership abilities, loyalty and reliability, while younger 
workers are usually more creative and flexible. Furthermore, younger workers are often 
supposed to have an advantage regarding physical skills, recent intellectual skills, and 
learning motivation relative to older workers (Boockmann and Zwick 2004). A compo-
sition of heterogeneous teams consisting of both younger and older workers is likely to 
utilize the age-specific capabilities of the workers complementarily. In principle, both 
age-groups can benefit mutually by such a team formation. Older workers acquire new 
skills and keep innovative cooperating with younger workers, while younger workers 
benefit from the experiences and the firm-specific knowledge of senior workers. It 
would thus be profitable for the firm to support the knowledge transfer between age-
groups. Therefore, the adoption of team work in mixed age-groups should be accompa-
nied by management practices mentioned in subsection V.1.  
 
An inherent risk of team work in mixed age-groups is the exaggeration of specializa-
tion, for example, within production teams, project teams, or R&D teams. Excessive 
specialization would probably be associated with an age-specific polarization, and thus, 
stagnation of skills, which in turn may impair the flexibility of staff assignment. Job 
rotation and job enrichment provide possible solutions to this problem.  
 
V.4 Cutting Seniority Wages 
 
According to Table A2 in the appendix about 50 percent of the firms in the sample re-
port on paying seniority wages to their workers voluntarily. The primary objective of 
seniority wages is to encourage employees to work hard until retirement. However, this 
delayed wage payment policy implies that the wages of older workers exceed their pro-
ductivity contributions. As a result, firms paying seniority wages would suffer financial 
losses on employing older workers. Furthermore, as new technologies and decentralized 
work organizations tend to decline the productivity of older workers, the discrepancy 
between wages and productivity continues to accelerate. In order to make the employ-
ment of older workers in an innovative working environment more profitable for the 
firms, cutting seniority wages, and thus, flattening wage profiles would be helpful 
(Lazear 1988, Skirbekk 2003). Flatter wage profiles imply that wages and individual 
productivity converge. Negative productivity-wage-differentials diminish and may even 
turn positive. However, a serious drawback of cutting seniority wages is that firms 
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abandon a powerful incentive mechanism. In this case, firms would be asked to substi-
tute seniority wages for an alternative incentive instrument.  
 
In this context, the use of fixed-term contracts represents an alternative mechanism to 
avoid paying seniority wages and employ older workers more profitable. If older work-
ers were employed on the basis of a fixed-term contract, firms could attach wages di-
rectly to individual productivity or below instead of paying delayed wage bonds. Hence, 
firms may benefit from establishing contingent work for older workers, because this 
management practice allows improving the gap between productivity and wages. Fur-
thermore, contingent contracts reduce dismissal costs for older workers, who would 
otherwise be protected by a number of dismissal rules (at least in Germany). Neverthe-
less, provided that fixed-term contracts improve their employment options, senior work-
ers will also benefit from this instrument.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
The present paper adds to the research stream on innovations and labor markets by 
studying the effects of technological and organizational change on the intra-firm age 
structure of workforces. Theoretical considerations predict that the adoption of techno-
logical and organizational innovations involves an age-specific labor demand favoring 
younger workers and hurting older workers. The analysis thereby emphasizes that tech-
nological and organizational changes are likely to accelerate skill obsolescence. Since 
firms are supposed to provide less retraining opportunities for older workers than 
younger workers, human capital depreciations will sometime exceed the current human 
capital investments. At this time, the declining net-investments in new skills will finally 
turn negative and the productivity of older workers will decrease. From the time when 
individual productivity falls below the corresponding wage level a firm loses on em-
ploying older workers.  
 
Using data from West German firms of the time period 1993-1995 the econometric 
analysis provides evidence for an age-biased technological and organizational change 
and thus confirms the ABTOC hypothesis. Specifically, the adoption of both techno-
logical and organizational innovations within firms significantly contributes to shifting 
the age structure of the workforce stacked against older workers. New technologies and 
organizational work practices complement to younger workers and substitute for senior 
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workers. The estimation results are robust to several specifications and different estima-
tion strategies.  
 
In times of ageing societies the results of this paper are very challenging for both the 
firms and labor market politicians. When technology and reorganization hurt older 
workers, in the long run the social systems of industrialized countries will be under con-
siderable strain. Moreover, due to the demographic developments in many industrial-
ized countries firms must prepare for a declining labor supply of younger workers and 
ageing labor forces. As a consequence, both the firms and labor market politicians are 
forced to develop strategies to cope with ageing workforces or improve the employment 
prospects of older workers, respectively. In this context, section V has discussed some 
adequate management practices from the viewpoint of the firms: age-specific job de-
sign, continuous training for older workers, team work in mixed age-groups, and cutting 
seniority wages. Actually, most of these adjustment strategies can be adopted in the 
short run, for example, team work in mixed age-groups in order to encourage the 
knowledge and experience transfer between younger and older workers. The adoption 
of other policies may sometimes be more time-consuming. One example for such a 
middle-term strategy is the reorganization of job design to lower monotonous work 
load.  
 
Politics should support these management practices by adjusting business environment. 
For example, if politicians lifted up mandatory retirement ages, firms would benefit 
from investing in the skills of older workers, because extended lifetime working times 
would on average be associated with enlarged time intervals of amortization. Second 
and perhaps even more important, politicians are desperate to reduce the incentives for 
early retirement. In recent years, several early retirement programs largely contribute to 
continuously declining the labor force participation rate of older workers in Germany. 
To make a long story short, early retirement rules allow firms to dismiss older employ-
ees in large part at the expense of the social security system. Hence, these rules have 
been creating a strong incentive for downsizing firms to lay older workers off. In order 
to stop this process, therefore, early retirement rules have to be withdrawn in the short 
run.  
 
This paper should not end without pointing to some aspects that could not directly be 
addressed in the empirical study. First, due to data limitations the skills of workers in 
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different age-groups could not explicitly be considered. Although the IAB Establish-
ment Panel provides data for the skill structure of the firms’ workforces, the skill di-
mension can not be combined with the age dimension to gain information on the work-
ers’ age and skills simultaneously. Hence, it may be argued that the empirical results 
suffer from not explicitly accounting for heterogeneous worker skills across age-
groups.19 However, this objection can be countered with the results of Aubert, Caroli 
and Roger (2006) and Beckmann, Schauenberg and Timmermann (2006). Neither of the 
papers found evidence for a limited age or gender bias, focusing not only on the age 
(gender) dimension but additionally on the skill dimension. In fact, age (gender) bias 
and skill bias are coexisting, where skill bias is shown to exist within age (gender) 
groups. Furthermore, the estimates for the control variable  (share of skilled 
workers within firms) in Table A3 in the appendix do also not give reason to suspect the 
measured age bias to be superposed by an unconsidered skill bias. On the contrary, 
there is no significant correlation between the share of skilled and older workers, while 
the correlation between skilled and younger workers is even slightly negative. Thus, the 
objection that younger workforces may, on average, be more skilled than older work-
forces, so technological and organizational change could rather supposed to be skill-
biased than age-biased, is obviously unfounded. For these reasons, the focus on the age 
dimension in this paper is unlikely to impair the conclusions achieved with respect to 
the robustness of the age bias. A more precise analysis that examines the impact of 
technological and organizational innovations on the firms’ demand for differently aged 
workers with heterogeneous skills, however, requires the application of linked em-
ployer-employee data, which are currently under construction in Germany. Such inves-
tigations must therefore be left to future studies.  
QUAL
 
The second aspect that could not directly be considered in this study is unobserved firm 
heterogeneity. Not accounting for unobserved firm heterogeneity can indeed bias the 
estimation results of cross sectional analyses. Unfortunately, the only panel wave that 
reveals information on the share of younger and older workers is the wave of 1995. As a 
consequence, estimation strategies that explicitly account for unobserved firm charac-
teristics, e.g. the first-difference estimator or the fixed effects estimator, cannot be ap-
plied. However, Black and Lynch (2001) propose an alternative strategy to address the 
                                                          
19 One might conclude that the ABTOC results could be biased in a way that technical and organizational 
change would rather be skill-biased than age-biased if skill differences were additionally considered. 
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problem of unobserved firm effects. Specifically, the authors enrich their basic model 
specification by adding a large number of control variables. The objective of this strat-
egy is to capture as much unobserved heterogeneity as possible by observed firm char-
acteristics. The present empirical examination follows this approach so that unobserved 
firm characteristics are unlikely to affect the obtained results substantially. Again, an 
empirical analysis that explicitly accounts for unobserved heterogeneity must also be 
left to future studies, when linked employer-employee data can be used. 
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Table 1  
Age-specific employment shares in relation to firm size (number of employees) 
Variable 0-4 5-19 20-99 100-199 200-1,999 ≥  2,000 All firms
YOUNG  23.30 31.73 28.98 24.70 25.83 24.46 27.37 
OLD  25.02 16.80 16.82 20.16 19.66 20.20 19.00 
Note: The calculations are restricted to firms that do not provide item non-responses for the regression 
analysis. The age-specific employment shares are displayed in percent.  
Source: IAB Establishment Panel 1995 (3rd wave West Germany), own calculations.  
 
 
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics of the variables indicating technological innovations 
Variable Intervall Mean Standard deviation 
TSTATUS  1-5 3.86 0.78 
TINVEST  0-2 1.29 0.77 
Note: The calculations are restricted to firms that do not provide item non-responses for the regression 
analysis.  
Source: IAB Establishment Panel 1995 (3rd wave West Germany), own calculations.  
 
 
Table 3 
Descriptive statistics of the variables indicating organizational innovations 
Variable Intervall Mean Standard deviation 
HLEVEL  0-1 0.27 0.44 
DELEGA  0-1 0.43 0.49 
TEAM  0-1 0.28 0.45 
DIVISION  0-1 0.32 0.46 
JIT  0-1 0.12 0.33 
PCENTER  0-1 0.24 0.43 
OC  0-6 1.69 1.67 
Note: The calculations are restricted to firms that do not provide item non-responses for the regression 
analysis.  
Source: IAB Establishment Panel 1995 (3rd wave West Germany), own calculations.  
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Table 4 
Technological and organizational innovations as determinants of an age-specific 
labor demand 
Dependent variable tYOUNG  tOLD  βF  test  
Panel A: basic model 
1−tTECH  2.238*** (0.418) -1.566*** (0.299) 0.000*** 
1−tORGA  0.076 (0.345) -0.506** (0.247) 0.235 
Panel B: Panel A + workforce characteristics + net employment reduction 
1−tTECH  1.054** (0.438) -0.802** (0.348) 0.003*** 
1−tORGA  0.344 (0.361) -0.616** (0.287) 0.069* 
Panel C: Panel B + incentive contracts + industrial relations 
1−tTECH  0.922** (0.448) -0.707** (0.353) 0.012** 
1−tORGA  0.615* (0.367) -0.760*** (0.290) 0.010*** 
Panel D: complete model 
1−tTECH  0.905** (0.455) -0.797** (0.354) 0.009*** 
1−tORGA  0.654* (0.373) -0.824*** (0.290) 0.006*** 
Panel E: robust OLS estimation of Panel D 
1−tTECH  0.905* (0.469) -0.797** (0.351)  
1−tORGA  0.654* (0.373) -0.824*** (0.264)  
F  test 11.33*** 7.49***  
2R  0.203 0.144  ρ  -0.314  
Breusch-Pagan test 161.37***  
N  1,634 1,634  
Note: */**/*** indicates significance at the 10/5/1 percent level. The coefficients in Panel A-D are esti-
mated by SOLS. The values in parentheses represent the estimated standard errors for the coefficients. 
The  test is an βF F  test on the equality of corresponding coefficients in both equations. The dis-
played values represent the prob values of the -statistics. The complete specification of Panel D 
additionally contains the model variables 
βF
( )WYln  and Kln  as well as control variables for the share 
of skilled workers, part-time workers, apprentices, and participants in further training programs, the 
amount of staff reduction, the firms’ use of incentive contracts (delayed payment contracts, pension 
plans), the commitment to collective wage bargaining, the existence of a works council, the firm’s 
proneness to seasonal fluctuations, the firm’s legal form, and the economic independence of a firm. 
Finally, three firm size dummies, nine sector dummies, and eleven dummies for the firm’s regional af-
filiation are added. In addition to TECH  and  the basic model of Panel A includes ORGA ( )WYln , 
Kln , the firm size and sector dummies. The F  test and  indicate the estimation quality of both 
equations. The parameter 
2R
ρ  describes the correlation coefficient between the residuals of the two 
equations. The Breusch-Pagan test examines the hypothesis that the calculated residuals are statisti-
cally independent.  indicates sample size. All the latter statistics refer to Panel D. N
Source: IAB Establishment Panel (waves 1993 and 1995), own calculations. 
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Appendix 
 
The following table contains the variables used in the regression analysis (except from 
firm size, sector, and regional dummies). Unless otherwise declared the reporting date is 
June 30th 1995.  
 
Table A1 
Description of the variables 
Variable Definition 
YOUNG  Share of workers (as a percentage of total workforce) not exceeding the 
age of 30 years 
OLD  Share of workers (as a percentage of total workforce) aged at least 50 
years 
TSTATUS  Ordinal variable ranged between 1 (firm uses obsolete technologies) and 
5 (firm uses state-of-the-art technologies) 
TINVEST  Variable ranging between 0 and 2; 0 = firms have neither invested in 
production technologies nor in information technologies in 1994; 1 = 
firms have either invested in production technologies or in information 
technologies; 2 = firms have invested in both production and information 
technologies 
HLEVEL  Dummy variable indicating whether or not firms have cut hierarchical 
levels before 1995 
DELEGA  Dummy variable indicating whether or not firms have delegated decision 
rights and responsibility to lower-ranked hierarchical levels before 1995 
TEAM  Dummy variable indicating whether or not firms have adopted team work 
concepts before 1995 
DIVISION  Dummy variable indicating whether or not firms have rationalized by 
combining the tasks of at least two departments or divisions before 1995 
JIT  Dummy variable indicating whether or not firms have changed their or-
ganization of production by adopting just-in-time production before 1995
PCENTER  Dummy variable indicating whether or not firms have established profit 
or cost center divisions before 1995 
OC  Count variable ranging between 0 (firm has not adopted any of the organ-
izational practices before 1995) and 6 (firm has adopted all considered 
organizational practices before 1995)  
Yln  Log of a firm’s total sales in 1994 in German Marks 
Kln  Log of a firm’s total investment in 1994 
QUAL  Share of skilled workers (as a percentage of total workforce) at June 30th 
1993, i.e., graduated workers who have completed vocational education 
or higher educational degrees 
PTIME  Share of part-time workers (as a percentage of total workforce) at June 
30th 1993 
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Table A1 
Description of the variables (continued)  
Variable Definition 
APPREN  Share of apprentices (as a percentage of total workforce) at June 30th 
1993 
FURTHER  Share of participants in further training programs (as a percentage of total 
workforce) at June 30th 1993 
DOWNSIZE
 
Censored variable; 0 = firms with a constant or increasing employment 
between June 30th 1992 and June 30th 1994; positive values = amount of 
net staff reduction between June 30th 1992 and June 30th 1994 in per-
cent.  
SENWAGE  Dummy variable indicating whether or not firms paid seniority wages 
according to a delayed payment contract in 1993 
PENSION  Ordinal variable between 1 and 3 indicating to what amount firms of-
fered pension plans in 1993; 1 = pension plans were not offered; 2 = pen-
sion plans were offered to a part of the workforce; 3 = pension plans 
were offered to all workers 
UNION  Dummy variable indicating whether or not firms commit to collective 
wage bargaining at the industry or firm level 
WORKC  Dummy variable indicating whether or not a firm has a works council  
DSHOCK  Dummy variable indicating whether or not a firm was prone to seasonal 
fluctuations in 1993 
AUTARK  Dummy variable indicating whether or not a firm was autarkic in 1993.  
PARTNER  Dummy variable indicating whether or not a firm was managed under the 
legal form of a one-man business or a business partnership in 1993 
Source: IAB Establishment Panel (waves 1993 and 1995).  
 
 32
Table A2 
Descriptive statistics of the variables not explicitly mentioned in the text 
Variable Intervall Mean Standard deviation 
( )WYln  -2.26-6.83 1.62 1.05 
Kln  0-21.19 12.19 5.46 
QUAL  0-100 % 62.33 % 26.09 
PTIME  0-98.87 % 11.68 % 15.13 
APPREN  0-94.54 % 4.72 % 6.07 
FURTHER  0-95.83 % 10.36 % 14.34 
DOWNSIZE  0-97.25 % 7.91 % 12.40 
SENWAGE  0-1 0.51 0.50 
PENSION  1-3 2.21 0.83 
UNION  0-1 0.88 0.31 
WORKC  0-1 0.72 0.44 
DSHOCK  0-1 0.50 0.50 
AUTARK  0-1 0.51 0.49 
PARTNER  0-1 0.17 0.38 
Note: The calculations are restricted to firms that do not provide item non-responses for the regression 
analysis. Firms without any investments in 1994 have been corrected by setting total investment to 1 
DM, so that these firms need not to be excluded from the analysis by taking logs. Due to simplifica-
tion time indices are not displayed.  
Source: IAB Establishment Panel (waves 1993 and 1995), own calculations.  
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Table A3 
Parameter estimates of the variables not listed in Table 4 (Panel D) 
Dependent variable YOUNG  OLD  
Explanatory variables     
( )WYln  0.375 (0.435) -0.701** (0.338) 
Kln  -0.112 (0.090) 0.179** (0.070) 
QUAL  -0.025* (0.014) 0.005 (0.011) 
PTIME  -0.003 (0.026) 0.052*** (0.020) 
APPREN  0.889*** (0.061) -0.304*** (0.047) 
FURTHER  -0.024 (0.025) -0.027 (0.019) 
DOWNSIZE  -0.120*** (0.029) 0.042* (0.023) 
SENWAGE  0.768 (0.700) -0.656 (0.554) 
PENSION  -1.064*** (0.412) 0.236 (0.320) 
UNION  -1.055 (1.252) 2.561*** (0.973) 
WORKC  -2.935*** (1.061) 3.204*** (0.824) 
DSHOCK  -0.348 (0.726) 0.039 (0.564) 
AUTARK  -0.599 (0.738) 0.305 (0.574) 
PARTNER  -0.182 (0.949) 0.754 (0.737) 
CONST  29.337*** (3.906) 15.817*** (3.035) 
Note: */**/*** indicates significance at the 10/5/1 percent level. The coefficients are estimated by SOLS. 
The values in parentheses represent the estimated standard errors for the coefficients. Additionally, 
the model contains three firm size dummies, nine sector dummies, and eleven dummies for the firm’s 
regional affiliation. Due to simplification time indices are not displayed.  
Source: IAB Establishment Panel (waves 1993 and 1995), own calculations.  
 
 
 34
References 
 
Acemoglu, K. Daron. “Technical Change, Inequality, and the Labor Market.” Journal of 
Economic Literature 40 (2002): 7-72. 
Acemoglu, Daron, and Pischke, Jörn-Steffen. “Beyond Becker: Training in Imperfect 
Labour Markets.” Economic Journal 109 (1999a): F112-F142.  
Acemoglu, Daron, and Pischke, Jörn-Steffen. “The Structure of Wages and Investment 
in General Training.” Journal of Political Economy 107 (1999b): 539-572.  
Adams, Scott J. “Passed Over for Promotion Because of Age: An Empirical Analysis of 
the Consequences.” Journal of Labor Research 23 (2002): 447- 461.  
Aghion, Philippe; Caroli, Eve; and Garcia-Penalosa, Cecilia. “Inequality and Economic 
Growth: The Perspective of New Growth Theories.” Journal of Economic Literature 
37 (1999): 1615-1660.  
Ahituv, Avner, and Zeira, Joseph. “Technical Progress and Early Retirement.” Mimeo. 
Cambridge, MA: Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2001.  
Andersson, Fredrik; Holmlund, Bertil; and Lindh, Thomas. “Labor Productivity, Age 
and Education in Swedish Mining and Manufacturing 1985-96.” Mimeo. Uppsala: 
Department of Economics, Uppsala University, 2002. 
Antolin, Pablo, and Scarpetta, Stefano. “Microeconometric Analysis of the Retirement 
Decision: Germany.” OECD Economics Department Working Paper no. 204. Paris: 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1998. 
Aubert, Patrick; Caroli, Eve; and Roger, Muriel. “New Technologies, Organization and 
Age: Firm-Level Evidence.” Economic Journal 116 (2006): F73-F93. 
Bartel, Ann P., and Sicherman, Nachum. “Technological Change and Retirement Deci-
sions of Older Workers.” Journal of Labor Economics 11 (1993): 162-183.  
Becker, Gary S. “Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis.” Journal of 
Political Economy 70 (Supplement) (1962): 9-49. 
Beckmann, Michael. “Die Auswirkungen des betrieblichen Personalabbaus auf die Al-
tersstruktur der Belegschaften in westdeutschen Unternehmen.” In Entlohnung, Ar-
beitsorganisation und personalpolitische Regulierung, edited by Uschi Backes-
Gellner, Matthias Kräkel, Dieter Sadowski and Johannes Mure, pp. 217-242. Mün-
chen und Mering: Rainer Hampp Verlag, 2001.  
Beckmann, Michael. Betriebliche Personalpolitik im technologischen und organisatori-
schen Innovationsprozess. München und Mering: Rainer Hampp Verlag, 2004. 
Beckmann, Michael; Schauenberg, Bernd; and Timmermann, Andrea. “Betriebliche 
Innovationen und geschlechtsspezifische Arbeitsnachfrage.” Die Betriebswirtschaft 
66 (2006): 287-306.  
Black, Sandra E., and Lynch, Lisa M. “How to Compete: The Impact of Workplace 
Practices and Information Technology on Productivity.” Review of Economics and 
Statistics 83 (2001): 434-445. 
Blechinger, Doris, and Pfeiffer, Friedhelm. “Technological Change and Skill Obsoles-
cence: The Case of German Apprenticeship Training.” ZEW Discussion Paper No. 
96-15. Mannheim: Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung, 1996. 
 35
Boisjoly, Johanne; Duncan, Greg J.; and Smeeding, Timothy. “The Shifting Incidence 
of Involuntary Job Losses from 1968 to 1992.” Industrial Relations 37 (1998): 207-
231.  
Bond, Stephen, and Van Reenen, John. “Microeconometric Models of Investment and 
Employment”. Mimeo. London: Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2003.  
Boockmann, Bernhard, and Zwick, Thomas. “Betriebliche Determinanten der Beschäf-
tigung älterer Arbeitnehmer.” Zeitschrift für ArbeitsmarktForschung (Journal for 
Labour Market Research) 37 (2004): 53-63.  
Bresnahan, Timothy F.; Brynjolfsson, Erik; and Hitt, Lorin M. “Information Technol-
ogy, Workplace Organization and the Demand for Skilled Labor: Firm-Level Evi-
dence”. Quarterly Journal of Economics 117 (2002): 339-376.  
Buck, Hartmut; Kistner, Ernst; and Mendius, Hans Gerhard. “Demographischer Wandel 
in der Arbeitswelt: Chancen für eine innovative Arbeitsgestaltung”. Stuttgart, 2002.  
Card, David, and DiNardo, John E. “Skill-Biased Technological Change and Rising 
Wage Inequality: Some Problems and Puzzles”. Journal of Labor Economics 20 
(2002): 733-783.  
Card, David, and Lemieux, Thomas. “Can Falling Supply Explain the Rising Return to 
College for Younger Men? A Cohort-Based Analysis.” Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 116 (2001): 705-746.  
Caroli, Eve, and Van Reenen, John. “Skill Biased Organizational Change? Evidence 
from a Panel of British and French Establishments.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 
116 (2001): 1449-1492.  
Chan, Sevin, and Stevens, Ann Huff. “Job Loss and Employment Patterns of Older 
Workers.” Journal of Labor Economics 19 (2001): 484-521.  
Chennells Lucy, and Van Reenen, John. “Has Technology Hurt Less Skilled Workers? 
An Econometric Survey of the Effects of Technical Change on the Structure of Pay 
and Jobs.” IFS Working Paper no. W99/27. London: Institute for Fiscal Studies, 
1999. 
Christensen, Laurits R.; Jorgenson, Dale W.; and Lau, Lawrence J. “Transcendental 
Logarithmic Production Frontiers” Review of Economics and Statistics 55 (1973): 
28-45.  
Crepon, Bruno; Deniau, Nicolas; and Perez-Duarte, Sebastien. “Wages, Productivity, 
and Worker Characteristics: A French Perspective”. Mimeo. Paris: INSEE, 2002. 
Falk, Martin, and Seim, Katja. “Workers’ Skill Level and Information Technology: E-
vidence from German Service Firms”. In Panelanalysen zu Lohnstruktur, Qualifika-
tion und Beschäftigungsdynamik. Beiträge zur Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, 
BeitrAB 229, edited by Lutz Bellmann and Viktor Steiner, pp. 79-116. Nuremberg, 
1999.  
Friedberg, Leora “The Impact of Technological Change on Older Workers: Evidence 
from Data on Computer Use”. Industrial and Labor Relations Review 56 (2003): 
511-529.  
Haltiwanger, John C.; Lane, Julia I.; and Spletzer, James R. “Productivity Differences 
Across Employers: The Role of Employer Size, Age and Human Capital.” American 
Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 89 (1999): 94-98.  
 36
Holmstrom, Bengt, and Milgrom, Paul R. “The Firm as an Incentive System”. American 
Economic Review 84 (1994): 972-991.  
Hujer, Reinhard; Caliendo, Marco; and Radic, Dubravko. “Skill Biased Technological 
and Organizational Change: Estimating a Mixed Simultaneous Equation Model Us-
ing the IAB Establishment Panel.” IZA Discussion Paper no. 566. Bonn: Institut Zu-
kunft der Arbeit, 2002.  
Institute for Employment Research. “Zahlen-Fibel, Übersicht 3.1.2: Arbeitslosenquoten 
nach Altersgruppen: Bundesgebiet West.” http://doku.iab.de/zfibel/03_01_02.pdf 
(Status: August 24th 2004), 2002.  
Institute for Employment Research. “Zahlen-Fibel, Übersicht 3.6.2: Arbeitslosigkeit im 
Bundesgebiet (West) 1961-2002.” http://doku.iab.de/zfibel/03_06_02.pdf (Status: 
August 24th 2004), 2003.  
Klös, Hans-Peter. “Ältere Arbeitnehmer: Entwicklungstrends und beschäftigungspoliti-
scher Reformbedarf.” iw-trends 27 (2000): 71-88.  
Köchling, Annegret. “Leitfaden zur Früherkennung altersstruktureller Probleme im Be-
trieb.” http://www.demotrans.de/documents/PR508.pdf (Status: August 5th 2005), 
2000.  
Kotlikoff, Lawrence, and Gokhale, Jagadeesh. “Estimating a Firm’s Age-Productivity 
Profile Using the Present Value of a Worker’s Earnings.” Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 107 (1992): 1215-1242. 
Lazear, Edward P. “Why is there Mandatory Retirement?.” Journal of Political Econ-
omy 87 (1979): 1761-1784. 
Lazear, Edward P. “Agency, Earnings Profiles, Productivity, and Hours Restrictions.” 
American Economic Review 71 (1981): 606-620. 
Lazear, Edward P. “Adjusting to an Aging Labor Force.” NBER Working Paper no. 
2802. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1988.  
Lindbeck, Assar, and Snower, Dennis J. “Reorganization of Firms and Labor-Market 
Inequality.” American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 86 (1996): 315-
321.  
Lindbeck, Assar, and Snower, Dennis J. “Multitask Learning and the Reorganization of 
Work: From Tayloristic to Holistic Organization.” Journal of Labor Economics 18 
(2000): 353-376.  
Mendes de Oliviera, M.; Cohn, Elchanan; and Kiker B.F. “Tenure, Earnings and Pro-
ductivity.” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 51 (1989): 1-14. 
Milgrom, Paul R., and Roberts, John. “The Economics of Modern Manufacturing: 
Technology, Strategy, and Organization”. American Economic Review 80 (1990): 
511-528.  
Milgrom, Paul R., and Roberts, John. “Continuous Adjustment and Fundamental 
Change in Business Strategy and Organization.” In: Trends in Business Organiza-
tion: Do Participation and Cooperation Increase Competitiveness?, edited by Horst 
Siebert, pp. 231-258. Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1995.  
Mincer, Jacob. Schooling, Experience, and Earnings. New York: University Press for 
NBER, 1974.  
Peracchi, Franco, and Welch, Finis. “Trends in Labor Force Transitions of Older Men 
and Women.” Journal of Labor Economics 12 (1994): 210-242.  
 37
Rodriguez, Daniel, and Zavodny, Madeline. “Changes in the Age and Education Profile 
of Displaced Workers.” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 56 (2003): 498- 510.  
Rosen, Sherwin. “Measuring the Obsolescence of Knowledge.” In: Education, Income 
and Human Behavior, edited by F. Thomas Juster, pp. 199-232. New York: Carnegie 
Foundation and Columbia University Press, 1975. 
Skirbekk, Vegard. “Age and Individual Productivity: A Literature Survey.” MPIDR 
Working Paper WP 2003-028. Rostock: Max Planck Institute for Demographic Re-
search, 2003.  
Snower, Dennis J. “Causes of Changing Earnings Inequality.” IZA Discussion Paper no. 
29. Bonn: Institut Zukunft der Arbeit,1999.  
Strotmann, Harald, and Hess, Wolfgang. “Eigenschaften und Beschäftigungschancen 
älterer Arbeitnehmer sowie betriebliche Maßnahmen für ältere Arbeitnehmer in Ba-
den-Württemberg.” IAW-Kurzbericht 7/2003. Institut für Angewandte Wirtschafts-
forschung. Tübingen, 2003. 
Weinberg, Bruce A. “Computer Use and the Demand for Female Workers.” Industrial 
and Labor Relations Review 53 (2000): 290-308. 
White, Halbert. “A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a 
Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity.” Econometrica 48 (1980): 817-838.  
Wooldridge, Jeffrey M. Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. Cam-
bridge, MA and London: MIT Press, 2002.  
 
 
 38
